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I. INTRODUCTION
Even though negotiation is the most frequently used and
commonly accepted method employed when an international dispute
arises,1 international arbitration leads the 'way in solving these disputes
when negotiation seems futile. International arbitration has become the
innovative mechanism available to parties of separate states who cannot
resolve their differences through negotiation and want to avoid formal
court proceedings.2  This is evidenced by the recent maturation of
arbitration in the area of commercial disputes. Today, the world is a
much smaller place than it used to be. As a result, there are more
transactions between the states of the world involving trade and
investment, and therefore an efficient mechanism is necessary to quickly
solve disputes in order for relationships to remain harmonious.
An example of the need for quick settlements is the recent and
expedient creation of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is an organization created to deal
exclusively with investment disputes The main purpose behind the
creation of the ICSID was to make available an organization to which
parties could turn in order to quickly resolve disputes. Other evidence of
the need for a quick response to an international dispute has been shown
by the willingness of parties creating international agreements to include a
clause in the agreement establishing ad hoc arbitral tribunals to handle any
dispute that may arise under the agreement.4 These tribunals are created
1. J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT 2 (1984).
2. See notes 13-19 and accompanying text. Parties try to avoid formal court proceedings
because they are very costly and time consuming. Only large corporations are usually
willing to attempt litigation because they have the resources available to mount successful
attacks. But today even these large corporations are not as willing as they once were to
attempt litigation because their profit margins have plummeted during the past few years.
3. GEORGES DELAuME, CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
23-24 (J. Lew ed., 1987). The ICSID was created in 1966 to deal specifically with
investment disputes. It is sponsored by the World Bank and has been relatively successful
due to the financial support received from the World Bank.
4. Barry Carter, The Opportunities and Limits of Legal Remedies in Foreign Investment
Disputes, in MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 65
(F. Ghadar, et al. eds., 1983).
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and governed by rules established by the contracting parties! The parties
in turn usually draw upon rules constructed by other well-established
international arbitral organizations, such as the ICSID.6 The problem
with these institutional organizations and ad hoc tribunals does not come
from the decision to use such devices but from the ability to enforce the
award once rendered.
Once the parties from two different states agree to have any
dispute pertaining to the international agreement submitted to an
international arbitrational panel or an ad hoc tribunal, it is unclear whether
or not a decision executed by that panel will be enforced by the states of
the world where the losing party has assets sufficient to satisfy the award,
or where the party is a national of that particular state. In an attempt to
solve this dilemma, this Comment will evaluate two sets of rules which
will hopefully help answer that question. First, the doctrine which
governs international transactions is the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention).7
Second, the controlling statute of most arbitrations that occur in the United
States is the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).'
This Comment will discuss whether an arbitration award arising
out of a controversy between a United States citizen or corporation and a
foreign citizen or corporation will be regarded as a domestic award under
United States law.9 This distinction is critical because it will determine
5. Id. These ad hoc tribunals are created solely by the parties forming the contract.
The parties pick who will make up the arbitral panel, what administrative and procedural
rules they will follow, and the process, if any, which must be followed to appeal a decision.
6. Id. Not only does the ICSID have a well established set of rules that parties to
international agreements can use but the International Chamber of Commerce, the American
Arbitration Association, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce have established rules for
conducting arbitration proceedings.
7. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, reprinted in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988)
[hereinafter Convention].
8. Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) [hereinafter FAA]. As will be
discussed later, the FAA applies to domestic arbitration awards. This does not mean that all
foreign arbitration awards will fall outside the gambit of the FAA. This is due to United
States courts treating some foreign arbitral awards as domestic, which may be an incorrect
classification. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
9. "[A domestic] award is the decision or determination rendered by arbitrators or
commissioners, or other private or extrajudicial deciders, upon a controversy submitted to
them" by two parties which are nationals of, or the subject matter is so intertwined with, the
United States that this country has complete and absolute control over the dispute. See
BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 137 (6th ed. 1990).
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whether the FAA or the Convention is applied.1" If the award is
classified as domestic, even if an international panel renders the decision,
U.S. courts will apply the FAA. This application has far reaching
ramifications for the party who loses the arbitration because the FAA is
narrowly tailored as to when arbitration awards can be vacated." On the
other hand, the Convention has more defenses which can be implemented
by the losing party in order to render the award worthless.' It is this
10. See Convention, supra note 7, Article 1. Article 1, clause I of the Convention
specifically states that if an award is classified as a domestic award, it will not be covered by
the Convention. Therefore, the FAA will cover all awards which are classified as domestic
awards.
11. The following are grounds to vacate the award under the Federal Arbitration Act:
(1) fraud; (2) bias or corruption of the arbitrators; (3) misconduct of the arbitrators which
caused prejudice to a party; or (4) where an arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority. 9
U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
12. Article V of the New York Convention provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and
enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II
were, under the law applicable to them, under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was
made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of
the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not so submitted, that part-of the award
which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place;
or
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author's contention that when a United States citizen or corporation is
attempting to enforce an arbitration award in the U.S. against a foreign
entity, the courts are more likely to treat the award as a domestic award or
read the Convention narrowly so as to prevent the party who is seeking to
vacate the award from doing so. On the other hand, when a foreign entity
is seeking to enforce the award in the United States against a U.S. citizen
or corporation, the settlement will not be considered a domestic award,
moreover, the Convention will be interpreted broadly so that the award
can be easily vacated.
This Comment will support this belief through its three major
sections and short conclusion. First, this Comment will discuss the legal
framework of both international arbitration generally and international
arbitration within the United States with emphasis on the FAA and the
Convention. Second, this Comment will focus on the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards beginning with a background discussion which
indicates that states previously did not like to enforce arbitral awards
which were not rendered by its domestic courts. The discussion will then
turn to the enforcement mechanisms available to the party receiving a
favorable judgement. The Comment will then present a short discourse
concerning the resistance to enforcement which still exists today. Finally,
this Comment will look at the treatment of defenses against enforcement of
arbitral awards by courts within the United States by creating a
hypothetical controversy to illustrate the situation. This dispute will
attempt to demonstrate that U.S. courts treat situations differently when a
U.S. citizen or corporation is attempting to enforce an agreement against a
foreign party rather than a foreign citizen or corporation attempting to
enforce an agreement against a U.S. party. Finally, the Comment will
determine whether or not the hypothesis posed is correct.
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.
Convention, supra note 7, art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520.
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II. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
A. The Legal Framework of International Arbitration
Arbitration, unlike formal court proceedings, receives its
legitimacy from the consent of the parties to an agreement or existing
dispute." Consent can be arranged by having the parties articulate in
their agreement that if any dispute arises regarding the interpretation or
implementation of the agreement, that they will settle the dispute through
arbitration. On the other hand, if the dispute arises and parties have not
stipulated in the agreement that they will handle a dispute through
arbitration, they can still avoid formal court proceedings by agreeing to
arbitrate the dispute.
Why would the parties to an international agreement or an
existing international dispute want to submit their disputes to international
arbitration? Arbitration simply has more advantages than settlement of a
dispute using conventional norms. The leading problem associated with
the usefulness of arbitration is the fact that lawyers are unfamiliar with the
process and will forgo implementing this alternative.' However, the
benefits of arbitration greatly outweigh this problem and attorneys would
surely benefit if they took the time to learn the procedures.
Arbitration is a process of neutrality. The arbitrators are neutral
and need not apply the law of the state in which the dispute arises.
Neutrality ensures that the foreign party is not biased by the
implementation of local laws or by unfamiliarity with a foreign court
system.' Arbitration is inexpensive and efficient when compared to
formal court proceedings. 1 The parties are permitted to pick and choose
13. Robert von Mehren, From Vynoir's Case to Mitsubishi: The Future of Arbitration
and Public Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 583 (1986).
14. Michael H. Straub, Jr., Note, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Under Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A Proposal for Effective
Guidelines, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1035 (1990).
15. Jan Paulsson, The Role of the Swedish Courts in Transnational Commercial
Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 212 (1981); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Coming
Encounter: InternationalArbitration and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 595 (1983).
16. RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 10 (1885); Robert Coulson,
So Far, So Good: Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Arbitration Awards in United States
Courts, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 353, 353 (J. Lew
ed. 1986); W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID
Arbitration, 1989 DuKE LJ. 739, 747 (1989) (noting that a "major incentive for international
commercial arbitration...is its promise of simplicity, economy, supra-neutrality and speed").
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who the arbitrators will be.17 Selecting the arbitrator is very beneficial to
parties because they can select individuals who have expertise in the law
and the trade customs encompassing the particular industry involved in the
dispute, instead of submitting the dispute to a judge who has only general
knowledge of the law controlling that industry."8
Arbitration is also beneficial to the public because private disputes
are handled in private ways, thus avoiding the use of national courts. By
using arbitration, states will save money, since not all disputes will end up
in court. Using arbitration will also enable the courts to handle more
disputes that involve public as opposed to private interests.1 9
Once the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration,
they must agree upon what arbitral institution they will retain to govern the
proceedings. This decision should not be taken lightly since different
institutions have varying rules governing the handling of a dispute. When
an attorney drafts an agreement which provides for arbitration through an
arbitral clause or submission agreement, there are basically four arbitral
institutions to which a dispute can be referred.
First, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) established a
Court of Arbitration during the 1930's.' The Court is not a judicial
court, but rather is composed of tribunals of one or three arbitrators who
apply the Court's well established procedural rules, known as the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce.' The Court of Arbitration is not used as much as some of
the other institutions because it fixes both the administrative charges and
the arbitrators' costs based on graduated schedules founded on the
percentage of the amount of the total claim, rather than imposing charges
only to cover actual expenses accrued as do other arbitral institutions.=
Also, fewer disputes are being referred to the ICC since there is no
effective enforcement mechanism once a decision is handed down.
Second, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) has gained wide-spread popularity over the past few
years. As will be discussed in further detail below, the ICSID has
established an elaborate doctrine of rules and regulations which are to be
17. ALBERT VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION I (1981).
18. Id.
19. Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT'L LAW
187, 198 (1989).
20. Carolyn B. Lamm, Recent Developments in International Arbitration, 36 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 276 (1989).
21. Id. at 277. See generally Carter, supra note 4, at 65.
22. See Lamm, supra note 20, at 277.
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implemented when a signatory to the ICSID Convention brings a dispute to
the tribunal.' Once the ICSID renders a decision, that decision must be
enforced by all the signatories to the ICSID Convention. However,
problems arise when one party attempts to collect from a party who has
assets in a state 'not a signatory to the ICSID Convention, or when the
state is unwilling to enforce the award. These problems will be discussed
throughout the remainder of this Comment.
The popularity of the ICSID stems from its comprehensive set of
rules called the Rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes created by the international convention establishing
the ICSID in 1966.' These rules ensure that signatories to the
convention, once they have consented to ICSID arbitration, cannot refuse
to arbitrate,2' will be treated fairly whether they are the breaching party
or not since the ICSID is free from the control of domestic courts,27 and
will not be subject to outrageous expense because the ICSID only requires
payment to cover the actual costs of the arbitration." The ICSID is of
vital importance because it requires every signatory to the convention "to
recognize any such awards and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed
by the award as if it were a final judgement of a court in the recognizing
state."9
Third, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) has created a
set of rules called the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. The AAA rules have gained growing importance
in the arena of international arbitration in recent years."0 Like the other
rules previously mentioned, the AAA rules are well established, and are
important in conducting arbitral proceedings."1  However, unlike the
ICSID, the AAA rules provide no mechanisms for enforcement of the
23. See Carter, supra note 4, at 64-68.
24. See Delaume, supra note 3, at 24.
25. See Carter, supra note 4, at 65.




30. See Carter, supra note 4, at 65. The AAA, though based in the United States,
"handles hundreds of international cases annually, many of them involving substantial sums."
ROBERT COULSON, BUSINEss ARBITRATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNow 121 (3d ed. 1986).
31. For a general discussion of the rules formulated under the AAA see Coulson, supra
note 30 at 121-123. Even though this is an organization established within the United States
and which has adopted various rules found in the United States governing arbitration
proceedings, many foreign parties have decided to use the rules of the AAA when creating ad
hoe tribunals.
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award once the decision is relinquished.32
Finally, if the contracting parties do not want to submit their
dispute to a particular institutional arrangement created to solve disputes
through arbitration but still want to arbitrate, the parties can either create
their own rules and pick the arbitratorse or, they may decide to adopt a
set of rules that are already firmly established, choose the arbitrators, and
then have the dispute settled.' An ad hoc arrangement enables the
parties to choose firmly rooted rules instead of creating a new set of rules
which would be extremely time consuming and frustrating. While the
parties avoid fees charged by the particular institution, they still benefit
from the organization's established rules."
Once the agreement to arbitrate has been finalized, the institution
which will hear the dispute has been chosen, and a dispute exists, all that
needs to be answered is how a decision will be enforced once the
arbitrators have rendered a decision.
Early in the history of international arbitration a concern
developed which focused on the ability to enforce arbitral awards once
they were furnished.36 This concern focused on the premise that "an
award that cannot be enforced is worthless. "' If this problem could not
be solved, arbitration on the world stage would not be a viable alterative
to formal court proceedings. In order to solve this problem, some type of
international law had to be enacted. However, international law can only
be created by custom,' treaty,39 international organizations,' through
32. If a party does not voluntarily comply with an award rendered by the AAA, the
party seeking enforcement of the award must turn to the courts of the state the party has
assets to cover the award in order to force that party to comply with the AAA decision. See
Coulson, supra note 30 at 121-129 for a general discussion of the AAA.
33. See Carter, supra note 4, at 65.
34. Id. at 64-68. See also, JOHN LIDDLE SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE, 1-40 (1959) (a historical analysis of how ad hoc
tribunals have gained acceptance as a worthwhile device that can successfully be used in
arbitration).
35. The parties need only pay an international arbitration organization when they have
requested the organization to hear the dispute, apply its rules, and have an award rendered by
its arbitrators.
36. Albert Van den Berg, Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement Under
the New York and ICSID Conventions, 2 ICS1D REv. 439 (1987).
37. J. Sorton Jones, International Arbitration, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
213, 222 (1985).
38. JOSEPH GABRIEL STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 34-38 (9th ed.
1984).
39. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 77 (1991).
40. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 602-03 (2d ed. 1986).
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principles which are believed to be so important to the international
community that divergence is not permitted,41 or through the United
Nations General Assembly which has the power to make recommendati6ns
which can eventually lead to the creation of international law by
custom.' For the purposes of this Comment, the only concept of
importance is the creation of international law through the United Nations
General Assembly.
In 1958 the states of the world came together within the United
Nations to draft and pass the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Conivention).' "The purpose
of the 1958 Convention was to promote international arbitration by
ensuring enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in each acceding nation's
courts."' The mechanisms of the Convention are intended to provide a
structure by which arbitration can be conducted successfully in the
international arena.'
B. The United States and International Arbitration Law
Prior to the Convention, the United States had its own version of
a doctrine intended to promote arbitration; however, the doctrine
encouraged arbitration over formal court proceedings only when the
dispute involved domestic commercial or contractual agreements. This
doctrine was passed in 1925 and is today still called the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)." Congress did not envision the FAA dealing
with non-commercial, private disputes, or disputes involving governmental
entities.47 In addition, the FAA proved to be an unsuccessful device
when it came to helping foreign entities who attempted to have foreign
41. Id. at 81-84. These principles are usually referred to as general principles of law.
42. UNITED NATIONS, BASIC FACTS ABoUT THE UNITED NATIONS, 1-17 (1989). The
United Nations General Assembly has no inherent power to create international law but can
pass resolutions and suggest law through conventions. If the states of the world begin to
adhere to a resolution or a particular convention, an international law will begin to emerge
because law is being created through custom.
43. See Convention, supra note 7.
44. Heather R. Evans, Note, The Nonarbitrability of Subject Matter Defense to
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 329, 329 (1989).
45. Hazel Fox, States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1-2
(1988).
46. See FAA, supra note 8.
47. Id.
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arbitral awards enforced in the United States.48
Due to the fact that the FAA was not capable of helping foreign
parties enforce foreign arbitral awards, coupled with the fact that policy
makers finally understood the importance of international arbitration, the
United States became a signatory to the Convention in 1970.49 There is a
divergence of opinion as to whether the Convention should be considered
as a separate doctrine instead of as a part of the FAA. Some scholars
argue that the Convention is a component of the FAA, thereby making the
FAA the only source of statutory law dealing with the enforcement of
international arbitral awards.'0 Others argue that the Convention and the
FAA are independent of each other, thus creating two sources of statutory
law within the United States dealing with this one subject.'1
This divergence of opinion has great implications because each
document has a separate set of defenses which may be implemented to
prevent the enforcement of an arbitral award. If only one document
exists, then only one set of exceptions exist because the two instruments
have been fused together. However, if the documents are considered
separately, two sets of exceptions exist. When this occurs, a court will
have to decide two important issues. First, it must decide which document
takes precedence. Second, if the FAA takes precedence, the court must
decide whether this document can be applied to a foreign arbitral award
even though it was not intended to cover such issues.' The position that
seems to be taken more often than not is that the two documents form one
complete doctrine.'
This proposition helps support the hypothesis because the FAA
has narrowly tailored exceptions to the enforcement of arbitral awards, no
matter if it is applied to a foreign or domestic award. Therefore, courts
have fewer exceptions to which they can apply their judicial magic, thus
creating less opportunity for an entity of the United States to benefit from
48. Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J.
1049, 1058 (1961).
49. See Convention, supra note 7.
50. See Michael F. Hoellering, Provisions of U.S. Law on Arbitration Agreements, in
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ARBITRATION & THE LAW: 1987-88, 170 (1988).
51. See Van den Berg, supra note 17, at 7; Stewart C. Boyd, Commentaire, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IST INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 393,
394 (N. Antaki & A. Prujiner eds., 1985).
52. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
53. The reason for this belief comes from the fact that the Convention is a part of the
FAA as is evidenced by the fact that the FAA was amended in 1970 to make the Convention
a part of it.
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a broad interpretation which could ultimately lead to the award not being
enforced.' On the other hand, if the documents are treated as one,
courts can interpret the defenses to enforcement in ways which will benefit
entities from the United States because the exceptions in the Convention
are broadly stated to provide wide latitude for interpretation by the states
of the world:'
I1. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
A. Background
"Historically, Anglo-Saxon courts opposed the arbitral
process." 6 The reason for this dislike stems from the fact that English
judges received their salary according to how many cases they heard.'
On the other hand, judges gave the reason that arbitration was an
unnecessary evil and that such a device would "oust" them of their
jurisdiction.' This was a poor explanation for their refusal to allow
arbitration or enforce arbitral awards. However, this doctrine, which
became known as the "ouster" doctrine, became part of American law. 9
This history, and the explanation of the progression of arbitration
within the United States which follows, are necessary to understand the
proposed hypothesis. In the early nineteenth century, arbitration emerged
as a viable alternative to formal court proceedings. The Supreme Court
openly believed that a policy demanding compliance with arbitral awards
rendered before judicial proceedings began and entered into with the
consent of both parties when a dispute existed should be strictly
followed.' The Supreme Court also stated that arbitral awards should
receive judicial encouragement and should not be set aside for mistakes of
law or fact as long as the hearing was full, fair, and the arbitrators were
54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. There are only four defenses available
under the FAA and only defense (4) seems to provide any room for judicial interpretation.
55. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56. Straub, supra note 14, at 1035. See also Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532
(1746); Vynoir's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 597 (1611).
57. Straub, supra note 14, at 1039.
58. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974).
59. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (holding that parties cannot make
agreements to oust a court of jurisdiction prior to .the existence of a dispute).
60. Karthaus v. Yllas Ferrer, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 222, 228 (1828). "It is a settled rule, in
the construction of awards, that no intendment shall be indulged to overturn an award, but
every reasonable intendment shall be allowed to uphold it." Id.
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honest and impartial.6"
The Supreme Court was reluctant, however, to permit all forms
of arbitration. The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts were
unwilling to enforce agreements to arbitrate that were found in contractual
agreements prior to the existence of a dispute.' These clauses were said
to be "revocable and non-enforceable."' The Supreme Court went
further and said that "[e]very citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of
the country, and to invoke the protection which all laws or all those courts
may afford him."" In a civil case, a party could consent to submit his
case to arbitration, but a person could not obligate himself or herself by
writing a clause in an agreement requiring arbitration whenever a dispute
arises, because the Court believed a person could not forfeit his or her
rights before a dispute existed.' In addition to this restriction, no
legislation or court decision specifically dealt with the problem of
enforcement of an arbitral award once a decision was rendered.
Compliance was voluntary, and if the losing party did not adhere to the
decision, the winning party had to utilize the court system and suffer the
inconveniences associated with that system which he or she was originally
trying to avoid. Finally, no instruments existed which could successfully
deal with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. This could have
been due to the small number of international transactions taking place
which could give rise to the need for mechanisms to deal with international
disputes. Therefore, arbitration was not of great importance to the states
of the world, thus explaining why there were no devices in the United
States available to deal with international disputes.
As time passed, courts in the United States realized how
beneficial arbitration could be in reducing case loads and began to
encourage voluntary arbitration when the situation warranted. However,
the courts were still unwilling to make large advances in this area without
Congressional approval." Therefore, in 1925, Congress passed the
FAA,67 which opened the door for courts to extend the practice of
encouraging arbitration. However, after the passage of the FAA, courts
61. Burchell v. Marsch, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 350 (1854). Here the Court held that,
"[c]ourts should be careful to avoid a wrong use of the word 'mistake', and, by making it
synonymous with mere error of judgement, assume to themselves an arbitrary power over
awards." Id.
62. See von Mehren, supra note 13 at 590.
63. Id. at 589-590.
64. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).
65. Id.
66. See von Mehren, supra note 13.
67. See FAA, supra note 8. The Act was first enacted in 1925, at 93 Stat. 883.
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were hesitant to permit unabridged arbitration domestically and were even
more reluctant when it came to international matters. The courts, as well
as Congress, refused to get involved in international arbitration. One
illustration of this position is the refusal of the United States to become a
signatory of the 1958 Convention dealing with the enforcement of
international arbitral awards until 1970.' This reluctance could have
been .due to the world outlook (stressing peaceful co-existence and
isolationism) that existed during this period which shaped international
relations between states. 69
Today, the courts are willing to permit arbitration, as exhibited by
recent U.S. court decisions which allow domestic" as well as
international arbitration.' Furthermore, courts have rendered decisions
which permit parties to private agreements to include forum selection
clauses. By allowing such devices, the courts have virtually done away
with the "ouster" doctrine.' Also, courts have held that parties may
include clauses in their international agreements which specifically state
that the settlement of any dispute arising under the agreement will be
resolved through arbitration.' Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
remained silent on the issue of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
This silence has caused numerous problems because it has left the lower
courts with little guidance as to how the FAA and the Convention should
be applied, ultimately leaving judges confused and uncertain on how to
68. See Convention, supra note 7. Even though the Convention was opened for
ratification in 1958, the United States refused to become a signatory until twelve years later.
69. See Shaw, supra note 40, at 30. "War was no longer regarded as inevitable between
capitalist and socialist countries and a period of mutual tolerance and co-operation was
inaugurated." Id.
70. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors, Inc.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 885 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), motion denied, 489 U.S. 1007, and cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1077 (1989); DeCantis v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 123
(E.D. Va. 1974).
71. See, e.g., Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948
(S.D. Ohio 1981); Essex Cement Co. v. Italmare, S.p.A., 763 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). This is a very small representation of the vast number of cases involving foreign
arbitration heard by courts in the United States.
72. Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), a ff'd on reh'g,
446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
73. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
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proceed.74
B. Enforcement Mechanisms
In general, parties voluntarily comply with arbitral awards.7'
However, arbitral awards are not self-executing. If one party refuses to
abide by the arbitrator's decision, that award must be turned into a
judgement which can be administered by the mechanisms of the state
created for enforcement purposes.76  Arbitration loses its advantages"
over litigation if resort must be made to the judicial system of another
country. Therefore, enforcement of arbitral awards has become the
principal threat to the increasing use of arbitration in solving international
disputes between parties of differing nationalities.
To learn about how the international community deals with the
problem of enforcement of arbitral awards, one can look to either the
ICSID or the Convention. As discussed previously,'8 the ICSID requires
all signatories to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States to treat all arbitral awards as
if they were the final judgement of a court of that state.79  This
requirement has had the effect of making almost all awards rendered by
the ICSID enforceable in any state in which the losing party has assets as
long as that state is a signatory to the ICSID Convention.
The Convention is the statutory law which governs the
enforcement of arbitral awards in the international arena. The Convention
requires "each contracting state [to] recognize arbitral awards as binding
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon . . . .. " Therefore, if a state is a
member of the Convention it has a duty and an obligation to enforce
74. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). The decision reached by this court shows its
willingness to construe the defenses narrowly so as to prevent parties from being able to
avoid the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. But this was just one court's interpretation,
and the court was not sure if this was the proper avenue to pursue.
75. See George Goldberg, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 59 (2d
ed. 1983); Pierre Lalive, Enforcing Awards, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION-A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 317, 319 (1984).
76. See Fox, supra note 45; V.S. Deshpande, Enforcement of Foreign Awards in India,
U.K., and U.S.A., 4 J. INT'L ARB. 41, 43 (1987); See also Straub, supra note 14, at 1044.
77. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the
advantages associated with arbitration.
78. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
80. Convention, supra note 7, art. 111, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519.
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awards declared by international arbitral panels created under the auspices
of the Convention.
In 1970 the United States became a signatory to the Convention.
In that same year, the United States made the Convention part of its law
by amending the FAA.' Therefore, since the United States is a
signatory, it must abide by the aforementioned requirement in its
international commercial relationships.'
C. Resistance to Enforcement
Enforcement is not automatically achieved just because an award
is handed down by an arbitral panel. Under Article V of the Convention,
recognition and enforcement of an award may be denied.' However, it
is important to keep in mind that the primary goal of the Convention was
to remove hurdles which hindered enforcement.' Therefore, courts in
the United States have routinely required that the party resisting
enforcement shoulder the burden of proof.'
As discussed earlier,' the FAA is another source which may be
available to the party opposing enforcement of an arbitral award.87
Unlike the Convention, the FAA grounds to vacate an award are extremely
narrow. Therefore, if the FAA is applied to an arbitral award and a party
attempts to resist enforcement, the chances of a successful attempt will be
greatly reduced.
From the facts and circumstances of the cases discussed in this
Comment, it will become clear to the reader that the FAA will not apply
to these cases and fact patterns which are similar to these disputes. This is
due to the fact that a dispute which involves international arbitration will
have at its origin an international commercial dispute. The decisions
which are rendered in such controversies are clearly not considered
81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988).
82. See Convention, supra note 7, art. 111, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519.
83. See Convention, supra note 12, art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520.
84. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1974).
85. See Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d
1357, 1364 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Imperial Ethiopian
Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1976); American Constr. Mach.
& Equip. Corp. v. Mechanised Constr. of Pakistan Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff'd 828 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988); Geotech
Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Sys., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
86. See supra notes 11, 47-56 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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domestic awards' and Congress has said that the Convention will apply
to such disputes, not the FAA.' Furthermore, the FAA was specifically
implemented to deal with domestic arbitration." The FAA was recently
amended to reflect the importance of international arbitration by
incorporating the Convention into the FAA.' It would be hard to
imagine a congressional intent other than the one indicating a desire for
the Convention to govern international arbitrations.
As previously mentioned, this has important ramifications on a
party attempting to have an award vacated.' Since the exceptions under
Article V of the Convention can be construed broadly to thwart
enforcement, a party would be better off having the Convention rather
than the FAA apply. Therefore, since the Convention will be applied by
the courts in the United States when a party attempts to enforce an award,
the opposing party has two advantages. One, the party has more defenses
at its disposal that can be argued which may lead to the non-enforcement
of the award." Two, courts in the United States may be willing to
construe the defenses broadly in order to prevent enforcement. 94
88. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
89. By becoming a signatory to the Convention, the United States must abide by its
requirements. Article I of the Convention states that this doctrine shall not apply to domestic
awards. Therefore, in the United States, the FAA will govern any award classified as
domestic.
90. See FAA, supra note 8.
91. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988).
92. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
93. See Convention, supra note 12, art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520.
94. The exceptions found under Article V of the Convention are broadly stated leaving
wide latitude for interpreting exactly what they mean. For example, Article V clause 2(b) is
a catch-all phrase stating that "the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary
to the public policy of that country." It is very difficult to determine what "contrary to the
public policy" means, leaving the door wide open for courts to apply their judicial magic.
THE UNITED STATES' DOUBLE STANDARD
IV. TREATMENT OF DEFENSES AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL
AWARDS BY COURTS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
A. Smith & Jones Import Co. v. Commonwealth of Independent States
Manufacturing Co., A Hypothetical Examination to Illustrate the
Situation9s
A hypothetical case can best demonstrate how courts in the United
States may attempt to apply the Convention in the future if they are not
already doing what this Comment suggests has been taking place. Smith
& Jones Import Co. (Smith) is a corporation incorporated in and
conducting most of its business within the .United States. With the recent
elimination of Communism and the emergence of democracy and a market
economy within the Commonwealth of Independent States (formerly the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Smith feels the time is ripe to export
to the Commonwealth a product which the Communist system has
prevented from being introduced legally into the country - blue jeans.
The sale of blue jeans has been so favorable that Smith has decided to
avoid the high export costs by opening a manufacturing plant in the
Commonwealth. Due to certain laws in the Commonwealth, Smith may
not directly own the new plant, and therefore a contract has been
concluded between Smith and the Commonwealth of Independent States
Manufacturing Company (CISMC). The contract gives CISMC the right
to produce blue jeans but must direct all questions concerning the
operation of the plant to Smith who- must then give a timely response.
The contract also has an elaborate section dealing with the return of
investment that Smith must realize within the first ten years of operation,
as well as a clause providing CISMC with an opportunity to buy Smith out
if certain conditions are satisfied. Finally, the contract contains a clause
requiring all disputes to be settled by an arbitral panel.'
Things work well for the first five years but then CISMC decides
that it no longer wants to submit questions dealing with the operation of
the plant to Smith. Furthermore, CISMC no longer wants to pay the
amount required by the contract to Smith as a return of the initial
investment. In short, CISMC wants to take over the plant and keep all
95. The two parties chosen are fictitious. If they have any relation to a company in
existence, it' is purely coincidental. The facts and circumstances of this case are also
fictitious and the author apologizes for any resemblance to any existing situation or entity.
96. For simplicity sake, a specific arbitral panel was not chosen so that an unnecessary
discussion would not take place regarding what rules would govern the arbitration
proceedings. Therefore, assume that a generic arbitral panel using generic rules heard the
dispute.
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profits earned in the Commonwealth within the Commonwealth. CISMC
realizes a dispute exists, because Smith does not go along with what has
been proposed, and therefore, as the contract requires it, and because both
parties have indicated a willingness to abide by the clause requiring any
dispute to be handled by arbitration, the dispute will be submitted to an
arbitral panel.
The arbitrators hearing this dispute find that CISMC has breached
its contract obligations. First, CISMC is required by the contract to
submit all questions regarding operation of the plant to Smith. Second,
CISMC is required to pay Smith a sum certain for ten years so that Smith
can realize its initial investment. Third, CISMC did not follow the proper
procedure necessary to buy Smith out and take control of the plant.
Therefore, the arbitrators award Smith $2,000,000 in damages. Smith
attempts to collect the award from CISMC through informal channels but
this effort proves futile.
B. United States Citizen or Corporation Attempting to
Enforce an Arbitral Award Within the United States
During the first five years of operation, CISMC had turned a
considerable profit and, with the advice of Smith, had invested that profit
in various ventures within the United States. These assets totalled some
$2,000,000. Since Smith could not secure voluntary compliance of the
arbitral award from CISMC, Smith turned to the courts in the United
States to enforce the award rendered by the arbitral panel by transferring
the CISMC assets found in the United States to Smith. CISMC believes
that the award should not be enforced because it falls within the provisions
of Article V of the Convention."
There are two choices for courts in the United States in
determining whether or not an arbitral award will be enforced when a
United States citizen or corporation is involved in the dispute. First, the
court may decide that the award is a domestic award and therefore, the
Convention, along with its exceptions, does not apply to enforce the
award.' If this is the situation, courts will apply the FAA and its
narrow list of defenses in determining whether or not the award will be
enforced." In this hypothetical situation, any court would have a very
difficult time defending a position that this is a domestic award because the
97. To avoid an unnecessary discussion which goes beyond the scope of this Comment,
assume that CISMC argues each and every exception found in Article V of the Convention as
a defense to the enforcement of the arbitral award.
98. See Convention, supra note 7 and accompanying text, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519.
99. See FAA, supra note 11.
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controversy clearly involves an international transaction between two
parties of differing nationalities." °  Therefore, the FAA is inapplicable
to the case at hand and requires a court to apply the Convention.
10
'
Second, since the court handling this dispute must apply the
Convention, it must determine how it will interpret the exceptions found
under Article V."~ If the court gives a very broad reading to the
exceptions, the party attempting to prove that the award should not be
enforced will have a better opportunity to persuade the court not to enforce
the award. On the other hand, if the court gives a narrow reading to
Article V, the party arguing against enforcement will have a very difficult
time of swaying the court to its side. This is where the double standard
comes'into play.
Applying what has been discussed in this section to the proposed
hypothesis of this Comment, the conclusion can be reached that if a United
States citizen or corporation believes that the award should be enforced,
courts will give a narrow reading to the exceptions so that the other party
will have a very hard time of procuring judgement in its favor.
Alternatively, if the entity from the United States is the party attempting to
resist enforcement by using an Article V exception, courts in the United
States will give a broad interpretation of the exceptions thereby allowing
the party to avoid its obligation under the arbitral award. Therefore, in
the hypothetical case, the court hearing this dispute will give a very
narrow reading to the Article V exceptions, thus allowing Smith to collect
its award.
C. Foreign Citizen or Corporation Attempting to Enforce an Agreement
Rendered by an Arbitral Panel in the United States
It is necessary to modify the hypothetical case in order to explain
this situation. Instead of having CISMC breach the contract, Smith
breaches the contract by not supplying the technical advice necessary for
the continued success of the plant. Both parties agree to abide by the
100. See supra note 9. The hypothetical situation does not fall within the definition of
what constitutes a domestic award because the subject matter which.is involved in the dispute
is not so closely connected to the United States that it has priority over the dispute. Also,
only one of the parties is an entity of the United States, therefore courts in the United States
do not have automatic jurisdiction over the dispute.
101. Throughout this Comment it has been discussed that when an award is not
classified as domestic, the Convention will be used in determining whether the award will be
enforced. See Convention, supra note 7, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519.
102. The door is now open for the court to interpret the exceptions any way it desires
because the exceptions found under Article V are so broadly stated. See supra note 94.
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contractual clause which requires any dispute to be submitted to an arbitral
panel. The arbitral panel decides that Smith has breached the contract and
awards CISMC $2,500,000 in damages. CISMC attempts to collect the
award from Smith, but Smith is unwilling to cooperate. Smith's assets,
which would satisfy the award, are located in the United States. CISMC
petitions federal courts in the United States to enforce the arbitral award.
Smith argues according to Article V of the Convention that the award
cannot be enforced."u
Courts have two options when a United States entity attempts to
avoid enforcement of an arbitral award. First, the court can say that the
award is, in reality, a domestic award and, therefore the Convention does
not apply.1 " If a court were to apply this reasoning, the American party
would be at a disadvantage because the FAA with its limited exceptions
would apply and it would be very difficult for the court to withhold
enforcement based on one of those exceptions. Therefore, a court would
be unwilling to treat this award as domestic. Second, since the court must
apply the Convention,"5 it is believed that the court will give a broad
interpretation to the exceptions found under Article V so that the American
entity can successfully combat the enforcement of the award.'"°
Based on what has been stated in this section and applying it to
the proposed hypothesis of this Comment, one can understand how the
courts in the hypothetical situation will apply the exceptions found under
Article V of the Convention broadly so that Smith may avoid paying the
amount required under the arbitral award just because Smith is an
American corporation.
D. Application of the Enforcement Doctrine Found in the
Convention by Courts Within the United States
Since the Supreme Court has not had a case dealing with the
enforcement of an international arbitral award brought or argued before it,
it is necessary to look at lower court decisions to determine if the
proposed hypothesis stated at the beginning of this Comment is correct.
Since the concept of solving international disputes through arbitration is
relatively new,"° there are very few cases dealing specifically with the
103. See supra note 10.
104. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
105. See Convention, supra note 7, art. I1, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519.
106. The tables have been reversed and it is my belief that the courts in the United
States will give a broad interpretation to the defenses when an American entity, such as
Smith, tries to resist enforcement of the award.
107. See Carter, supra note 4, at 64.
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issue. However, three leading cases give an indication of how courts in
the United State' deal with this issue.
The first case is Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA),1° in which an American
corporation appealed from a district court decision affirming a foreign
arbitral award. The foreign award held the American corporation liable to
the Egyptian defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the decision rendered by the district court, -and in the process
construed two exceptions to the convention narrowly so as to deny the
American corporation any benefit. that the exceptions may have
offered. 1  The court reasoned that an expansive reading of the
exceptions to the Convention would frustrate the purposes behind the
Convention."'
A similar outcome was reached in Biotronik Mess-und
Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co."'
Biotronik, a foreign corporation, brought suit in order to have a foreign
arbitral award enforced against Medford, an American corporation. The
district court hearing the dispute decided to enforce the foreign arbitral
award because the advantages of arbitration and the considerations of
international reciprocity require the protection of the integrity of arbitral
awards and thus require a narrow construction of the defenses to the
enforcement of these awards.m
Finally, in Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya (Libya),l13 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia refused to enforce the foreign arbitral
award against Libya when Libya invoked- one of the exceptions provided
by the Convention to the enforcement of the award."' This decision
showed the court's willingness to use an exception provided by the
Convention even though it was used against an American corporation.
Looking at these cases in isolation would clearly indicate that the
proposed hypothesis is incorrect. However, one must consider what was
108. 508 F.2d 969, 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
109. Id. The two exceptions discussed in this case were the public policy defense and
the nonarbitrability defense. See Article V of the New York Convention, supra note 12.
110. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1974).
111. 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.NJ. 1976).
112. Id.
113. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This
case was settled on March 20, 1981 while an appeal was pending to the court of appeals,
which on May 6, 1981 vacated the district court decision without reason.
114. Libyan American Oil, 684 F.2d at 1179.
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going on in the world at the time these three decisions were rendered.
Whittemore was decided four years after the United States became a
signatory to the Convention. It involved a corporation located in Egypt, a
country the United States was desperately trying to keep in its favor due to
the instability of the Middle East. With this background in mind, the
argument can be made that this was a political decision rather than a
decision consistent with established law. The courts involved wanted to
show the world that the United States was willing to abide by the
Convention and, at the same time, wanted to keep Egypt pleased by
making sure corporations within its territory would not be denied a foreign
arbitral award by a broad reading of the exceptions found in the
Convention.
The reasoning behind the decision in Biotronik is similar to that
found in Whittemore. Biotronik was a corporation located in West
Germany. The cold-war was still going at full strength. The United
States needed West Germany as an ally in Western Europe. West
Germany was so close to the Soviet Union that a defensive strike could be
mounted within minutes of an attack against the United States or any
member of NATO.S The United States could not afford to upset any
of its allies in Western Europe; this consideration could have been a factor
in the court's decision in favor of Biotronik.
The decision reached in the LIAMCO case was rendered six years
after the Convention became the law of the United States, thus indicating
that courts within the United States may still have been unwilling to stray
from the narrow interpretation made by previous courts of the exceptions
in Article V of the Convention." 6 More importantly, the United States
was greatly dependent upon the Middle East, including Libya, for oil. If
the court involved had ruled the other way, the United States could have
been severely disabled, since it was already in the midst of an energy
crisis resulting from the tensions and controversy that existed in the
Middle East. If the opposite decision had been reached, the United States
could have been thrust deeper into an already existing depression which
could have lasted for years. The court may have ruled in favor of Libya
in order to avoid that possibility.
115. The United States could not afford to upset West Germany because it needed that
country to support a large contingency of U.S. military and nuclear weapons that could
respond in an instant against the Soviet Union. Also, the United States was worried about
the possible spread of communism into West Germany, so it needed to do everything it could
do to prevent such an occurrence.
116. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete
GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
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However, since there has not been a significant court decision for
years dealing with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, it is hard to
say whether the trend found in these three cases still holds fast today. In
all likelihood, it does not. It has been more than twenty years since the
United States became a signatory to the Convention. Courts are likely to
interpret the exceptions more broadly than ever. Moreover, the world has
drastically changed over the past twenty years. No longer must the United
States worry about upsetting an ally located in Western Europe because the
Soviet Union is no longer a valid threat to the United States Also, the
United States learned its lesson during the 1970s and is no longer as
dependent on the Middle East as it once was for the production and supply
of oil. Therefore, United States courts can better afford to hand down
decisions which" may be unfavorable to foreign interests -but which are
beneficial to corporations and citizens that are members of its society.
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitration has become an important instrument available to
parties drafting international agreements. It can be used to solve a dispute
once the parties realize that the conflict cannot be resolved through
informal channels and they desire to avoid the problems associated with
formal legal proceedings.117  However, arbitration is not free of
problems. As this Comment has attempted to demonstrate, once an
arbitral award is rendered a party may have a difficult time enforcing that
award if the other party refuses to voluntarily comply with the arbitrator's
decision. Recently, states of the world have come together to create an
instrument that ensures that the party receiving a favorable arbitral
judgement has some device to turn to in order to make other states enforce
the award, even if the unfavorable decision goes against an entity which
was a national of that state.118
The United States was slow to recognize arbitration as a viable
alternative to solving disputes involving international transactions, as is
demonstrated by its reluctance to become a signatory to the Convention.'1 9
In the period immediately following United States' adherence to the
Convention, courts in this country strictly applied the Convention and
narrowly interpreted the exceptions found under Article V of the
117. Parties want to avoid the high cost and unreasonable delay in having their dispute
follow the normal course of going through their state's national court system or the other
party's court system.
118. Convention, supra note 7.
119. See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
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Conventionm to uphold virtually all petitions to enforce an arbitral
award. However, as time changes, so does the world. The world we now
live in is very different from that which existed only twenty years ago.
No longer must the United States worry about fighting communism, or
where its next barrel of oil is going to come from; therefore, courts have a
greater opportunity to render decisions consistent with the law but contrary
to these other interests.
Unfortunately, there have been very few court decisions dealing
with the enforcement of arbitral awards that could be analyzed to help
prove the hypothesis proposed in this Comment. However, with the
various changes taking place within our world, the opportunity for such
analysis will be available over the next decade. More disputes involving
international agreements will exist due to the growing interdependence of
the states of the world. Consequently, it cannot be determined whether or
not the hypothesis asserted at the beginning of this Comment is correct.
That decision must be left for another day. It can only be suggested that
the hypothesis is correct because courts in the United States will find it
necessary to protect national interests and spur the continued development
of this nation by reading the exceptions found under Article V of the
Convention broadly. The goal is to encourage both individuals and
corporations to get involved in the international arena without worrying
about outrageous foreign arbitral awards.
David M. Kall
120. See supra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
